USA v. Dianthe Martinez-Brooks by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-16-2020 
USA v. Dianthe Martinez-Brooks 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Dianthe Martinez-Brooks" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 287. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/287 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2020 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 18-3194 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
 DIANTHE MARTINEZ-BROOKS, 
        
    Appellant  
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
District Court No. 2-18-cr-00038-001 
District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 2, 2020 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 16, 2020)        
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION*
_____________________        
 
                       
SMITH, Chief Judge.  
 
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Dianthe Martinez-Brooks pleaded guilty to a 
scheme to defraud the Newark Watershed Conservation and Development Corporation 
(“NWCDC”) of honest services, money, and property through the use of interstate wire 
transmissions, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1343, 1346.  Martinez-Brooks appeals from 
the District Court’s judgment and sentence.  Since Martinez-Brooks waived her right to 
appeal, we will affirm. 
 Because Martinez-Brooks’s plea agreement contained an appellate waiver, we focus 
our analysis on the enforceability of that waiver.1  We will enforce an appellate waiver 
“where [1] the issues on appeal fall within the scope of the waiver and [2] the defendant 
knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the waiver, unless [3] enforcing the waiver would 
work a miscarriage of justice.”  United States v. Castro, 704 F.3d 125, 135 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(alterations in the original) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
First, Martinez-Brooks claims that the District Court inappropriately applied a four-
point enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(3) because the NWCDC was not a public 
entity.  This issue, however, falls within the scope of the appellate waiver for several 
reasons: (1) Martinez-Brooks stipulated to the use of U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(3); (2) she 
waived the right to appeal if she received a sentence below a stipulated range, which she 
did; and (3) she waived the right to challenge any stipulation that the District Court 
accepted. 
 
1 This appeal is from a final sentence and judgment in a criminal case.  The District Court 
had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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Second, the record indicates that Martinez-Brooks knowingly and voluntarily 
waived her appellate rights.  To hold that an appellate waiver was knowing and voluntary, 
this Court must be “satisfied that the district court inform[ed] the defendant of, and 
determine[d] that the defendant underst[ood] . . . the terms of any plea-agreement provision 
waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.”  United States v. Mabry, 
536 F.3d 231, 239 (3d Cir. 2008) (alterations in the original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The written plea agreement and hearing transcript demonstrate that Martinez-
Brooks understood the waiver.  The District Court engaged in a thorough and detailed plea 
colloquy with Martinez-Brooks before accepting the guilty plea, including an examination 
of whether Martinez-Brooks appreciated the nature of the appellate rights being waived.  
Martinez-Brooks told the District Court that she understood the consequences of her 
waiver, and the District Court was satisfied that she understood her rights.  We agree and 
therefore conclude that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. 
Third, we discern no error that amounts to a miscarriage of justice.2 
We will therefore affirm the District Court.3 
 
2 We consider the following factors when determining whether the waiver results in a 
miscarriage of justice: “[T]he clarity of the error, its gravity, its character (e.g., whether it 
concerns a fact issue, a sentencing guideline, or a statutory maximum), the impact of the 
error on the defendant, the impact of correcting the error on the government, and the extent 
to which the defendant acquiesced in the result.”  United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 
563 (3d Cir. 2001) (alterations in the original). 
3 Appellant’s reliance on Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897 (2018), is 
misplaced.  Rosales-Mireles is about Rule 52(b), not appellate waiver.  Moreover, the 
double-counting mistake in Rosales-Mireles is unlike the alleged error in this case. 
